Hamshahri examined why Iran did not close the Strait of Hormuz in previous years. The paper argues that closing the strait would have required military action within the waterway, and Iran’s policy has never been to initiate war.

A preemptive move would have undermined Iran’s legal legitimacy and created an international consensus against it. For the Islamic Republic, public opinion and international legitimacy have always mattered, and the logic of the Iranian Revolution is also exported through this same framework. Therefore, this option always remained at the level of a threat. But today, if such an action has occurred, it has taken place within the framework of legitimate defense — and naturally, under these circumstances, Iran will not relinquish what it has gained. The paper adds that Trump’s foolishness opened this path for Iran in the first place.

Ettelaat: Agreement or war?!

Ettelaat, in an analysis, examined the lack of agreement in the negotiations between Iran and the United States. According to the paper, the 21‑hour talks ended without reaching a final deal. One of the main challenges of the meeting was the ambiguity surrounding the scope of the ceasefire: the US and Iran disagreed on whether the ceasefire should include other areas, such as Lebanon. Iran insisted that all fronts of conflict be covered, while the United States emphasized specific limitations. The future of the ceasefire and the negotiations is closely tied to the political will of both sides, the role of mediators, and the support of the international community. If Tehran and Washington fail to rebuild trust, the likelihood of renewed hostilities will increase. Conversely, if the talks continue in more specialized rounds, the temporary ceasefire could potentially evolve into a more durable agreement — a decision that would affect not only the two countries but the entire region and global energy markets.

Siasat‑e-Rooz: We will not abandon the Strait of Hormuz

Siasat‑e-Rooz, in its editorial, emphasized the importance of maintaining control over the Strait of Hormuz. The editorial argues that Iran has extensive experience with US unreliability — from negotiations that led nowhere to agreements that were later dismantled by Washington. Therefore, Iran will not relinquish the Strait of Hormuz. The chokepoint of the region is now in Iran’s hands; the strategic and sensitive waterway of Hormuz is under the control of Iran’s armed forces, and every ship must pass through with Iran’s permission. This waterway cannot be opened through war; any military attack aimed at forcing it open would only make the strait narrower. American officials, military generals, and experts are well aware of this. However, if war against Iran breaks out again, the enemy must understand that this time will be very different from previous rounds — the attacks will be heavier, more destructive, and comprehensive.

Etemad: The assassination of diplomacy

Etemad, in a commentary, discussed Israel’s objective in assassinating senior Iranian policymakers. It wrote that in the complex conditions of the military confrontation involving the US and Israel against Iran, assassination is not merely the physical elimination of a rival — it is ‘the destruction of a pathway.’ If diplomacy is understood as the mediating language that prevents a final clash, then the simultaneous assassination of Ali Larijani (Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council) and Seyyed Kamal Kharrazi (Head of the Strategic Council on Foreign Relations) would amount to cutting off the language of dialogue and shutting the windows of diplomatic rationality within the Islamic Republic’s structure. This hypothetical event must be analyzed within the broader design shaped by the combination of Netanyahu, Washington hardliners, and Trump’s doctrine of elimination. Removing these two figures would mean eliminating diplomatic strategists. Through such an act, Israel would in effect be targeting the ‘intellectual reservoir’ of any potential negotiations.

Arman‑e-Emrooz: The gradual erosion of pressure tools

According to Arman‑e-Emrooz, the United States — especially during Donald Trump’s presidency — pursued a strategy toward Iran based on maximum pressure. This policy was designed to force fundamental behavioral change in Iran, but in practice, it not only failed to achieve the stated goals but also produced a kind of strategic erosion for Washington. The US withdrawal from the JCPOA, which was supposed to serve as a pressure lever for extracting more concessions, instead reduced monitoring mechanisms and deepened mistrust. Internationally, the rift between the US and its allies widened, and the credibility of Washington’s commitments came under question. In this context, the idea of negotiations in Islamabad cannot be viewed merely as a diplomatic initiative; rather, it should be understood as an attempt to buy time and recalibrate strategy. Pakistan, as an actor with relatively balanced relations, provides a low‑cost environment for informal engagement — a place where new pathways can be tested without media or political pressure.